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Review of Orbit by Mozilla

Mathew Duggan

• 19 min read

Recently Mozilla announced the first of what will presumably be a number of LLM-powered tools designed to assist them with advancing a future with "trustworthy AI". You can read their whole thing here. This first stab at the concept is a browser extension called "Orbit". It's a smart, limited risk approach to AI, unlike what Apple did which was serve everyone raw cake and tell you it's cooked with Apple Intelligence. Or Google destroying their search results, previously the "crown jewels" of the company.

Personally I'm not a huge fan of LLMs. I don't really think there is something like a "trustworthy LLM". But I think this is an interesting approach by Mozilla setting up what seems like a very isolated from their core infrastructure LLM appliance running Mistral LLM (Mistral 7B).

Taking Orbit Apart

You can install the Add-On here: https://orbitbymozilla.com/. I figured we should grab it, rip it apart and see what it does. First I grabbed the file with wget https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/downloads/file/4392515/orbit_summarizer-1.2.2.xpi` , renamed to .zip and peeked around.

background.js

Going through this file, it seems to be mostly doing what you would expect a "background.js" file does. I was originally thrown off by the chrome. thing until I saw that this is a convention for the WebExtensions API and many WebExtensions APIs in Firefox use the chrome.* namespace for compatibility with Chrome extensions, even though they also support the browser.* namespace as an alias.

  1. Sentry: I'm surprised a Mozilla add-on uses Sentry. However it does have a _sentryDebugIdIdentifier.
  2. Event listeners: The code sets up event listeners for various WebExtensions API events:
    • chrome.runtime.onConnect: Listens for incoming connections from the background script.
    • chrome.runtime.onMessage: Listens for messages from the browser.
    • chrome.runtime.onInstalled: Listens for installation and update events.
    • chrome.contextMenus: Listens for context menu clicks.
    • chrome.tabs: Listens for tab updates and removals.
  3. Background script: The code creates a background script that listens for incoming messages from the browser and executes various tasks, including:
    • Handling popup initialization.
    • Updating the "isEnabled" setting when the extension is installed or updated.
    • Creating new tabs with a welcome page URL (or an onboarding page).
    • Aborting video playback when the tab is removed.

Context menu items: The code creates two context menu items: "Summarize selection with Orbit" and "Summarize page with Orbit". These items trigger messages to be sent to the browser, which are then handled by the background script.

Server Elements

So it looks like Mozilla has a server set up to run the LLM powering Orbit. 

            De = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/prompt/stream", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ prompt: t, chat_token: e }) });
            },
            $e = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/chat_history/reinstate_session", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: e }, body: JSON.stringify({ token: t.sessionToken }) });
            },
            Me = function (t) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/chat_history/clear_session", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ token: t }) });
            },
            Re = function (t, e, n) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/chat_history/update_context_history", {
                    method: "POST",
                    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: e },
                    body: JSON.stringify({ prev_resp: t, token: n }),
                });
            },
            Ge = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/chat_history/index", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: e }, body: JSON.stringify({ page: t }) });
            },
            Ue = function (t, e, n, r, o, i, a, s) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/prompt/update", {
                    method: "POST",
                    headers: { "X-Orbit-Version": chrome.runtime.getManifest().version, "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: a },
                    body: JSON.stringify({ prompt: t, ai_context: o, context: e, title: n, chat_token: i, type: s, icon_url: r }),
                });
            },
            ze = function (t, e, n) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/prompt/store_result", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: n }, body: JSON.stringify({ ai_context: t, chat_token: e }) });
            },
            Fe = function (t) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/users/show", { method: "GET", mode: "cors", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: t } });
            },
            qe = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/users/sign_in", { method: "POST", mode: "cors", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ user: { email: t, password: e } }) });
            },
            He = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/users", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ user: { email: t, password: e } }) });
            },
            Ye = function (t) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/users/provider_auth", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ provider_name: "google", token: t }) });
            },
            We = function (t) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/users/sign_out", { method: "DELETE", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: t } });
            },
            Be = function (t) {
                return fetch(t, { method: "GET", headers: { Host: "docs.google.com", origin: "https://docs.google.com", Accept: "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8" } });
            },
            Je = function (t) {
                return fetch("https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/feedback", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify(t) });
            },
            Ke = function (t, e) {
                return fetch("".concat("https://orbitbymozilla.com/", "v1/orbit/chat_history/").concat(t), { method: "DELETE", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: e } });
            },
            Ve = function (t) {
                return fetch("".concat("https://orbitbymozilla.com/", "v1/orbit/chat_history/delete_all"), { method: "DELETE", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: t } });
            };
        function Xe(t) {
            return (
                (Xe =
                    "function" == typeof Symbol && "symbol" == typeof Symbol.iterator
                        ? function (t) {
                              return typeof t;
                          }
                        : function (t) {
                              return t && "function" == typeof Symbol && t.constructor === Symbol && t !== Symbol.prototype ? "symbol" : typeof t;
                          }),
                Xe(t)
            );
        }

Nothing too shocking here. I don't fully understand what the Google Docs is doing there.

content.js

This is where Orbit gets initialized. The code sets up several event listeners to handle incoming messages from the browser's runtime API

This code sets up event listeners for several message types, including "startup", "updatedUrl", and "responseStream". The chrome.runtime.onMessage function is used to listen for incoming messages from the browser's runtime API.

Slightly Mysterious Stuff

So multiple times in the code you see reference to gmail, youtube, outlook specifically. It seems that this plugin is geared towards providing summaries on those specific websites. Not to say that it won't attempt it on other sites, but those are the ones where it is hardcoded to work. The google.json is as follows:

{
  "main": "div[jsaction*=\"CyXzrf:.CLIENT\"]",
  "emailThread": "*[data-thread-perm-id*=\"thread-f\"], *[data-thread-perm-id*=\"thread-a\"]",
  "emailChains": ".h7[role*=\"listitem\"], .kv[role*=\"listitem\"]"
}

My guess about how this works is as follows:

main: "div[jsaction*=\"CyXzrf:.CLIENT\"]"

This selector targets div elements that have an attribute called jsaction with a value that starts with CyXzrf: and ends with .CLIENT. This suggests that the plugin is trying to select elements that contain a specific JavaScript action.

emailThread: "*[data-thread-perm-id*=\"thread-f\"]", "[data-thread-perm-id*=\"thread-a\"]"

This selector targets two types of elements:
* Elements with an attribute called data-thread-perm-id that has a value starting with thread-f.
* Elements with an attribute called data-thread-perm-id that has a value starting with thread-a.

The double quotes around the selectors indicate that they are using the CSS attribute selector syntax, which allows selecting elements based on their attributes.

emailChains: " .h7[role*=\"listitem\"], .kv[role*=\"listitem\"]"

This selector targets two types of elements:
* Elements with a class called h7 that have an attribute called role with a value containing the substring "listitem".
* Elements with a class called kv that have an attribute called role with a value containing the substring "listitem".

Weirdly the outlook.json and the youtube.json are both empty. I'm guessing for YouTube it grabs the text transcript and ships that off to the server. I don't see any reference to Outlook in the JS code, so I'm not clear how that works.

Orbit Network Traffic

So going into about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox I grabbed the Network Inspector for this plugin.

Running a summary on a random Ars Technica article looked like this:

Inspecting the requests, it looks like this is how it works.

POST to https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/prompt/update

It has null ai_context and a context of:

'Here is a page: Skip to content Story text * Subscribers only Learn more As many of us celebrated the year-end holidays, a small group of researchers worked overtime tracking a startling discovery: At least 33 browser extensions hosted in Google’s Chrome Web Store, some for as long as 18 months, were surreptitiously siphoning sensitive data from roughly 2.6 million devices.The compromises came to light with the discovery by data loss prevention service Cyberhaven that a Chrome extension used by 400,000 of …Worlds 10 Most Breathtakingly Beautiful Women.OMGIFactsUndoShe Was Everyones Dream Girl In 90s, This Is Her Recently.InvestructorUndoShe Was Everyones Dream Girl In 90s, This Is Her RecentlyBoite A ScoopUndo20 Classic Cars That Remain In High Demand For a ReasonChillingHistory.comUndo2024 Latest Stair Lifts: Ideal for Elderly, No Installation NeededStair Lift | Search AdsUndoCopenhagen - StairLift Elevators Could Be A Dream Come True For SeniorsStair Lift | Search AdUndo Search dialog... Sign in dialog...'

The response is clearly a reference for the plugin to wait and grab the result later: "orbit_message_store:488b357b-20cc-408d-a55e-bfa5219b102f_e057453954543a1733eaaa2996904b81d0fa3cef6fe15efeccdfe644228173f0"

Then we POST to https://prod.orbit-ml-front-api.fakespot.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net/invoke

{"config":{"configurable":{"key":"488b357b-20cc-408d-a55e-bfa5219b102f_e057453954543a1733eaaa2996904b81d0fa3cef6fe15efeccdfe644228173f0"},"metadata":{"key":"488b357b-20cc-408d-a55e-bfa5219b102f_e057453954543a1733eaaa2996904b81d0fa3cef6fe15efeccdfe644228173f0"},"recursionLimit":25,"tags":[]},"input":{"human_input":"generate_suggested_justquestions"},"kwargs":{}}

This service clearly generates the "suggested questions" in the plugin as seen in the response.

" Question 1: Which Chrome extensions were found to have surreptitiously collected sensitive data from users' devices, and how many users were affected?\n\nQuestion 2: How did the attackers exploit the Google OAuth permission system to upload malicious versions of the Chrome extensions to the Chrome Web Store?\n\nQuestion 3: What types of sensitive data were stolen by the malicious Chrome extensions, and which websites' authentication credentials were targeted?\n\nQuestion 4: What steps should organizations take to manage and secure the use of browser extensions in their security programs?\n\nQuestion 5: What is the potential impact on users who ran one of the compromised Chrome extensions, and what actions should they take to protect themselves?"

Finally we run a GET to prod.orbit-ml-front-api.fakespot.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net which seems to get the actual summary.

Finally we store_result. https://orbitbymozilla.com/v1/orbit/prompt/store_result is what we POST to with the following.

" At least 33 malicious Chrome extensions, some of which had been available in Google's Chrome Web Store for up to 18 months, were discovered to have been stealing sensitive data from approximately 2.6 million devices. The compromises came to light when a Chrome extension used by 400,000 of Cyberhaven's customers was found to have been updated with malicious code. The malicious version, available for 31 hours between Christmas Day and Boxing Day, automatically downloaded and installed on Chrome browsers running Cyberhaven during that window. The attacker gained access to the extension by sending a spear phishing email to the developers, posing as Google and warning that the extension would be revoked unless immediate action was taken. The attacker then used the granted permission to upload the malicious version. Other extensions were also targeted using the same method, with at least 19 identified as of Thursday afternoon. The earliest known compromise occurred in May 2023."
orbit_message_store:bb1d4e09-0ff9-4ba1-93e5-172f77257022_cfe62c87f51e4a81c5f0bbb85b3938bb4a7513a3ac9f11b3e537d35918d97f5b

I'm a little confused by this. I thought the summary wasn't stored server-side as explained by this:

Does Orbit save the content of the pages I visit or summaries generated?
No, it does not.
When you use Orbit, we receive a payload back that contains the contents of your query; information about the model queried (such as the name and version number); information about technical problems with processing the query, if any; the number of tokens required to process the query; and the model outputs in response to the query. We do not store this data beyond temporarily caching it to process your query and return the outputs to you.
Orbit summaries are only available on the page that you are actually on. As soon as you navigate away from that page, Orbit erases the session.

I'm not exactly clear how this can be true if it seems like I'm sending the summary back to Mozilla to an endpoint called store_result. They do say they "temporarily cache" the results so I guess they are covered in terms of how it works. It doesn't appear to me like an endpoint called store_result is a temporary storage endpoint, but who knows.

Does it work well?

So now that I've checked the extension and installed it, agreeing to this somewhat alarming permission screen:

It gives me a strange....hovering black hole icon?

When you click on the hovering black hole you get the following options:

You can do the following:

  • Ask Orbit, which is asking the plugin about anything on the specific page you are on.
  • Settings.

I strongly recommend "Minimal" to get rid of the large Bonzi Buddy type floating icon on the screen.

  • Summarize
  • Finally Snooze Orbit.

Testing

So let's try it out on some junk! We'll start with the Ars article from before. https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/01/dozens-of-backdoored-chrome-extensions-discovered-on-2-6-million-devices/

The summary is ok, if a little brief.

At least 33 malicious Chrome extensions, some of which had been available in Google's Chrome Web Store for up to 18 months, were discovered to have been stealing sensitive data from approximately 2.6 million devices. The compromises came to light when a Chrome extension used by 400,000 of Cyberhaven's customers was found to have been updated with malicious code. The malicious version, available for 31 hours between Christmas Day and Boxing Day, automatically downloaded and installed on Chrome browsers running Cyberhaven during that window. The attacker gained access to the extension by sending a spear phishing email to the developers, posing as Google and warning that the extension would be revoked unless immediate action was taken. The attacker then used the granted permission to upload the malicious version. Other extensions were also targeted using the same method, with at least 19 identified as of Thursday afternoon. The earliest known compromise occurred in May 2023.

Switching the settings to have it produce "paragraphs" resulted in a much more robust answer.

At least 33 malicious Chrome extensions, some of which had been available in Google's Chrome Web Store for up to 18 months, were discovered to have been stealing sensitive data from approximately 2.6 million devices. The compromises came to light when data loss prevention service Cyberhaven discovered that their own extension, used by 400,000 of its customers, had been updated with malicious code that stole their sensitive data. The malicious version was available for just 31 hours, from December 25 at 1:32 AM UTC to Dec 26 at 2:50 AM UTC, and automatically downloaded and installed on Chrome browsers running Cyberhaven during that window.
The malicious code was configured to work with different payloads that were downloaded from cyberhavenext.pro, a malicious site registered to give the appearance it was affiliated with the company. One recovered payload scoured user devices for browser cookies and authentication credentials for the facebook.com domain, while another stole cookies and credentials for chatgpt.com.
The attacker gained access to the Cyberhaven extension by sending a spear phishing email to the developers on Christmas Eve, warning that the extension wasn't in compliance with Google terms and would be revoked unless immediate action was taken. The email contained a link to a Google consent screen requesting access permission for an OAuth application named Privacy Policy Extension. A Cyberhaven developer granted the permission, unknowingly giving the attacker the ability to upload new versions of Cyberhaven's Chrome extension to the Chrome Web Store.
Other extensions were also targeted using the same spear phishing campaign, with at least 19 other Chrome extensions compromised as of Thursday afternoon. In every case, the attacker used spear phishing to push a new malicious version and custom, look-alike domains to issue payloads and receive authentication credentials. Collectively, the 20 extensions had 1.46 million downloads.
The earliest compromise occurred in May 2023. The full list of affected extensions and their details is provided in the article.
Browser extensions have long been a weak link in the security chain, with malicious extensions stealing sensitive data from 4 million devices in 2019, including those of companies like Tesla, Blue Origin, FireEye, Symantec, TMobile, and Reddit.
To mitigate the risk of malicious extensions, organizations can compile a browser asset management list that allows only selected extensions to run and blocks all others. However, this would not have prevented the Cyberhaven customers from installing the malicious extension version unless a specific version was trusted and all others were blocked.
Anyone who ran one of these compromised extensions is advised to carefully consider changing their passwords and other authentication credentials. Additional indicators of compromise can be found in the article and other posts.

The suggested questions are as follows:

According to the text, at least 33 Chrome extensions were found to have surreptitiously collected sensitive data from roughly 2.6 million devices. Some of the affected extensions include Cyberhaven, Uvoice, Internxt VPN, and Castorus. The malicious code was pushed out through a spear phishing campaign that targeted the developers of these extensions.

That's the answer to the first one. Since the article has a list of impacted extensions I would have expected it to return the full list of extensions.

The attackers exploited the Google OAuth permission system by tricking a Cyberhaven developer into granting them permission to upload new versions of the Chrome extension to the Chrome Web Store. They did this by sending a spear phishing email on Christmas Eve, posing as a Google representative and warning that the extension would be revoked unless immediate action was taken. The link in the email led to a Google consent screen, where the developer unknowingly granted the attacker the ability to upload new versions.

Second answer is a little bit stronger.

OpenAI Comparison

A recent investigation has uncovered that at least 33 malicious Chrome extensions, collectively installed on approximately 2.6 million devices, have been covertly extracting sensitive user data.
Key Findings:
• Discovery and Impact: The issue came to light when Cyberhaven, a data loss prevention service, found that a Chrome extension used by 400,000 of its customers had been compromised. The malicious version was available for 31 hours between December 25 and 26, during which it harvested sensitive information from users’ devices.
• Method of Compromise: Attackers employed spear-phishing emails targeting extension developers, tricking them into granting permissions that allowed the attackers to upload malicious versions of legitimate extensions to the Chrome Web Store. These versions were configured to download additional payloads from domains mimicking legitimate services, enabling the theft of browser cookies and authentication credentials.
• Scope of Affected Extensions: Beyond Cyberhaven’s extension, at least 19 other Chrome extensions were similarly compromised through this method, affecting a total of 1.46 million users. The attackers used custom, look-alike domains to distribute payloads and collect stolen credentials.
Recommendations for Users:
• Review Installed Extensions: Users should audit their browser extensions and remove any that are unnecessary or unfamiliar.
• Stay Informed: Regularly check for updates from trusted sources regarding compromised extensions to ensure your browser remains secure.
• Be Cautious with Permissions: Before installing extensions, scrutinize the permissions they request and be wary of granting access that seems excessive for the extension’s functionality.
This incident underscores the importance of vigilance when managing browser extensions, as they can become vectors for significant security breaches if compromised.

Review: Honestly they're both pretty bad. The first summary is missing a lot of relatively critical information. The second summary has most of that information, but is so long you might as well read the original source material. OpenAI decides it doesn't want to even read the article and sorta goes off on its own there.

Another One: https://lwn.net/Articles/1001783/

I was hoping the plain web style would help the plugin, but it seemed to have trouble right away. I suspect the comments section threw it off.

This one was a complete failure.

provider of plugins for a CMS that has a 62% market share.
That's not quite accurate. Automattic is the provider of the official plugin repository for WordPress, which is the most popular CMS. However, there are other plugin repositories and marketplaces, such as GitHub, where plugins can be distributed and installed directly.
The issue here is that Automattic has taken actions to prevent WP Engine from distributing plugins through the official repository, which WP Engine argues is damaging their business. WP Engine is seeking an injunction to restore their access to the repository.
The court has found that WP Engine is likely to succeed on the merits of their claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, as they have demonstrated that Automattic intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with their customers by blocking their access to the repository. The court has also found that WP Engine is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, as they will continue to lose customers and revenue.
However, it's important to note that this is just a preliminary injunction, and it does not necessarily mean that WP Engine will ultimately prevail in the case. The trial has not yet begun, and there will be further proceedings where both sides will present their evidence and arguments.
Legal jargon is significant.

Review: Disaster.

Try again! https://www.theverge.com/2025/1/5/24336154/samsung-the-frame-pro-features-specs

Ok this is at least a readable summary.

Samsung has announced the release of The Frame Pro, an upgraded version of its popular TV that aims to deliver both aesthetics and improved performance. The Frame Pro features Mini LED technology, which promises enhanced contrast, brightness, and black levels, although it does not offer the same level of local dimming as traditional Mini LED TVs. Additionally, the maximum refresh rate has been boosted to 144Hz for smoother visuals for PC gamers. However, Dolby Vision support is still not available. The Frame Pro also eliminates the need for a wire between the TV and Samsung's breakout box, resulting in less cable clutter. The TV is expected to ship in the spring, with pricing details yet to be announced.
The Frame Pro TV by Samsung introduces two major improvements compared to the regular model. First, it uses Mini LED technology along the bottom of the screen, which Samsung claims produces some level of local dimming. Second, it offers a higher maximum refresh rate of 144Hz for smoother visuals for PC gamers.
The Frame Pro by Samsung utilizes Mini LEDs placed along the bottom of the screen, which Samsung claims still produces some level of local dimming. However, this approach seems more similar to edge-lit TVs as it doesn't involve the large number of small dimming zones typically found in traditional Mini LED TVs.

This is fine. I think it's missing a few important things from the article. First it doesn't really convey any of the skepticism of the author.

The Frame has always been something of a compromise; maybe you’ve got a significant other who refuses to allow a dull black rectangle into the living room. So you, being the good and considerate person you are, ultimately agree to “settle” on The Frame. After first hearing about The Frame Pro, I was hopeful that it would be much less of a compromise.
But this asterisk around Mini LED has me a little less excited. Like recent models, The Frame Pro’s display has a matte finish to give your preferred art a more authentic appearance and mask the reality that you’re looking at a screen. But matte screens can sometimes lessen a display’s punch, so genuine Mini LED backlighting could’ve helped quite a bit in that regard.

It's also a pretty bare-boned summary. Here is the OpenAI comparison:

Samsung has announced The Frame Pro, an enhanced version of its popular TV model, The Frame, which combines home decor aesthetics with television functionality. 
Key Features of The Frame Pro:
• Mini LED Technology: The Frame Pro transitions to Mini LED technology, aiming to improve contrast, brightness, and black levels. Unlike traditional Mini LED setups with backlighting, Samsung places the Mini LEDs along the bottom of the screen, which may still result in an edge-lit TV feel. 
• Increased Refresh Rate: The maximum refresh rate is boosted from 120Hz to 144Hz, appealing to PC gamers seeking smoother visuals. 
• Wireless One Connect Box: The wired connection to the breakout box is eliminated, replaced by the Wireless One Connect Box supporting Wi-Fi 7. This box can function from up to 10 meters away, reducing cable clutter and enhancing the TV’s seamless integration into home decor. 
• AI-Powered Features: The Frame Pro includes AI-driven functionalities such as “Click to Search,” which provides information about actors, scenes, or clothing displayed on-screen; “Samsung Food,” recognizing dishes onscreen and offering recipes; and “Live Translate,” instantly translating closed captions on live broadcasts in up to seven languages. 
Design Considerations:
• Matte Finish Display: The TV maintains a matte finish to give displayed art a more authentic appearance, aligning with its design ethos of blending seamlessly into home decor. 
Availability and Pricing:
• Samsung plans to announce pricing details in the spring, coinciding with the product’s shipment schedule. The cost will be a significant factor in determining The Frame Pro’s appeal compared to the regular model. 
The Frame Pro aims to enhance the balance between aesthetic appeal and advanced television functionality, building upon the success of its predecessor by introducing technological upgrades and user-friendly features. 

This is still missing some of the subtext from the author about why the product is good or bad, but it does provide much more detail.

Review: Meh, it's pretty ok? I guess if you are really pressed for time. It seems to be missing a lot of important context about what this product is and what people might have wanted from it.

Last Test: email

I have my email on Fastmail, so we'll see how it does there. Here is the email.

At the heart of conservation are people like you — individuals who bring unique strengths to sustain and grow this vital work. This year, we’ve shared stories of the incredible women and communities driving change on the ground, and your support has been an integral part of those stories and our mission. Thanks to your generosity, Akashinga achieved remarkable milestones in 2024:
• Expanded our reach into key conservation areas, such as the Kunene Highlands in Namibia, safeguarding even more critical habitats.
• Trained over 70 new female rangers, equipping them to protect wildlife and support their communities.
• Protected 13 million acres of wilderness, ensuring a safe haven for countless species.
• Grew our global workforce to over 900 individuals, with 98% of staff being local and/or indigenous to the countries they are working in.
• Advanced community healthcare and infrastructure by implementing mobile health clinics and initiating additional solar-powered borehole projects within local communities.
Every dollar you gave directly strengthened conservation efforts and empowered communities across Southern and East Africa. Your commitment doesn’t just fund our mission — it makes you part of the Akashinga family, united in protecting our planet and fostering sustainability.
Thank you for being a vital voice in the Akashinga story.

Here is the summary:

Mathew received an email from Akashinga acknowledging his support in 2024, which significantly contributed to their conservation efforts. Akashinga expanded their reach into new areas, trained new female rangers, protected 13 million acres of wilderness, and grew their global workforce. Mathew's donation also funded community healthcare and infrastructure projects. Akashinga expressed gratitude for his commitment and considered him part of their family. The email was a thank you note and update on their achievements in 2024.

Review: I mean again like it's not wrong, it's just such a short summary. It seems to be missing a lot of important information. I'm not clear why the tool doesn't give me a bit more info even when I have "paragraphs" selected.

Conclusion

I get what Mozilla is going for here, but frankly this is a miss. I'm not really clear what it is doing with my summaries of websites, but it feels like they're storing them in a cache so they don't need to redo the summary every time. Outside of privacy, the summary is just too short to provide almost any useful information.

If you are someone who is drowning in websites and emails and just needs a super fast extremely high level overview of their content, give it a shot. It works pretty well for that and you can't beat the price. But if you are looking for a more nuanced understanding of articles and emails where you can ask meaningful follow-up questions and get answers, keep looking. This isn't there yet, although since most of the magic seems to be happening in their server, I guess there's nothing stopping them from improving the results over time.

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